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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jeffery Stegall asserts that the State has failed to demonstrate error in the district court's
order granting his motion to suppress the result of the State's Blood Alcohol Content
(hereinafter, BAC) test. The district court suppressed evidence of Mr. Stegall's BAC test result

after he requested, but was denied, the use of a telephone until nearly twelve hours had elapsed
since his arrest. The district court suppressed the State's evidence of Mr. Stegall's BAC test
results, finding that despite Mr. Stegall's request to use a telephone after the blood draw, he was
not given access to a telephone until sufficient time had passed that additional testing would not
have been useable as evidence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
While investigating a car accident, Corporal Jonathan Cushman observed a vehicle
parked on the side of the road, with its tire on the white fog line. (10/18/19 Tr., p.10, L.14 p.11, L.2; p.11, L.24 - p.12, L.5.) At approximately 6:20 p.m., Corporal Cushman approached
the vehicle and saw a man, later identified as Jeffery Stegall, sleeping in the driver's seat of the
car.

(10/18/19 Tr., p.13, Ls.12-15; p.14, Ls.2-11.)

The car was not running.

(10/18/19

Tr., p.17, L.1.) Once Corporal Cushman began speaking to Mr. Stegall, he smelled the odor of
alcohol in the car.

(10/18/19 Tr., p.16, Ls.9-25.)

Mr. Stegall had only an identification card.

(10/18/19 Tr., p.21, Ls.18-25.) Corporal Cushman began to investigate Mr. Stegall on suspicion
of DUI. (10/18/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.12-23.) Because of an outstanding arrest warrant, Corporal
Cushman opted to have Mr. Stegall perform FSTs back at the jail. (10/18/19 Tr., p.27, Ls.1521.) Mr. Stegall asked for a lawyer several times while en route to the jail. (10/18/19 Tr., p.55,
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L.23 - p.56, L.6; p.64, L.21 - p.65, L.7; p.73, Ls.16-22; p.74, Ls.10-12; State's Exhibit 2;
6:41:49.)

Once at the jail, law enforcement obtained a warrant for the withdrawal of

Mr. Stegall's blood. (10/18/19 Tr., p.109, Ls.13-14; R., pp.12, 16-17.) Mr. Stegall's blood was
drawn and tested at approximately 9:45 p.m., and the result was a BAC of 0.232. (10/18/19
Tr., p.58, L.4 - p.60, L.8; R., p.61; State's Exhibit 1.) Mr. Stegall asked to use a telephone
several times that evening, but was not given access to a phone. (10/18/19 Tr., p.100, L.2 p.101, L.14; p.111, Ls.14-22.)

He did not have access to a telephone until 5:30 a.m. the

following morning. (10/18/19 Tr., p.100, L.11 - p.102, L.8.) Mr. Stegall had two prior felony
DUI convictions in Idaho.

(R., p.12.)

Based on these facts, Mr. Stegall was charged by

Information with one count of felony DUI. (R., pp.33-35.)
Thereafter, Mr. Stegall moved to suppress the evidence arguing, in part, that he requested
use of a phone after the blood draw was performed and that request was denied until after
sufficient time had passed that additional testing would have been unusable as evidence, in
violation of his due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 1 (R., pp.50-64, 80-84.) The State claimed that "a due process violation only
occurs when the state denies the defendant the means to obtain exculpatory evidence 'upon [his]
request to arrange for an independent test."' (R., p.77 (quoting State v. Hedges, 143 Idaho 884,
887 (Ct. App. 2007).)
The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. (See generally, 10/18/19 Tr.)
After hearing argument from the parties, the district court took the matter under advisement.

1

The other issues raised in the suppression motion included the lawfulness of the seizure and the
admissibility of Mr. Stegall's un-Mirandized statements. (R., pp.53-59.) As the district court
denied the defense's motion on these grounds, these are not issue on appeal. (See R., pp.127-39;
App. Br.)
2

(10/18/19 Tr., p.119, L.10 - p.138, L.20.) The district court then issued a written decision
granting, in part, Mr. Stegall's motion to suppress evidence. (R., pp.127-43.)
The district court held that Mr. Stegall was unlawfully denied the use of a phone until
after an independent BAC test would not have provided useful evidence. (R., p.141.) The
district court granted the motion to suppress the results of the State's BAC test. (R., pp.139-41.)
The State appealed. (R, pp.148-51.)

3

ISSUE
Did the district court correctly grant Mr. Stegall's motion to suppress the BAC test result?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Stegall's Motion To Suppress His BAC Test Result

A.

Introduction
Mr. Stegall moved the district court to suppress the evidence seized because he

requested, but was denied, access to a telephone for a significant period of time, after which an
independent BAC test would not have provided useful evidence. The State's actions violated his
constitutional right to due process. This Court should affirm the order granting Mr. Stegall's
motion to suppress the results of the State's BAC test.
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568,
571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). This Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact "unless they
are clearly erroneous." State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014). "At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013).
This Court exercises free review of "the trial court's application of constitutional principles to
the facts found." Danney, 153 Idaho at 408. In those cases involving due process issues:
Where a defendant claims that his or her right to due process was violated, we
defer to the trial court's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence.
However, we freely review the application of constitutional principles to those
facts found. It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate facts that constitute a due
process violation.
State v. Jacobson, 150 Idaho 131, 134 (Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted.)
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C.

The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Stegall's Motion To Suppress His BAC Test
Result
In this case, the district court held,
The Defendant's motion to suppress the blood draw evidence is granted because
the Defendant requested use of a phone after the blood draw was performed, and
the Defendant was not given access to a phone until enough time had passed that
additional testing would have been unusable as evidence.

(R., p.139.) The district court relied upon the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Carr, 128
Idaho 181 (Ct. App. 1995). (R., p.140.)
The district court found the following:
In this case, the Defendant's testimony that he asked for a phone call from the
booking officer, and several other officers outside of those present during the
blood draw, was not challenged with conflicting evidence by the State. The State
offered evidence through testimony by Cpl. Cushman and Trp. Heinle that the
Defendant did not ask for a phone call from them, but the State did not offer
additional evidence regarding the Defendant's request for a phone call, other than
pointing out that he did not do so on the recordings provided to the Court.
Since the Defendant was not granted a phone call until the next morning, when an
evidentiary test would not be useable, this Court orders the suppression of the
State's blood draw evidence under due process grounds. The State is correct that
the Defendant is not entitled to a lawyer during a BAC test, but after the
conclusion of the BAC test, the Defendant cannot be restrained from the means to
conduct an independent test. In cases such as this, when the Defendant remains in
custody overnight, the utilization of a phone call is how the Defendant would
begin his effort to conduct an independent test. The State cites State v. Hedges,
143 Idaho 884, 886, 154 P.3d 1074, 1076 (Ct. App. 2007) to show that a
defendant must make an affirmative request for an independent BAC test in order
to trigger a due process claim. Defs Closing Argument 6. But State v. Hedges
does not overrule the holding in Carr that police must grant a defendant's request
for a phone call following a BAC test. Hedges instead dealt with the issue of a
defendant who never requested a phone call. "The record reflects that Hedges did
not request the use of a phone, nor did he ask to arrange for an independent BAC
test while he was in custody. State v. Hedges at 889. Rather, the defendant in
Hedges asserted, both at the Parma police station and again at the Canyon County
jail that he intended to get an independent test when he was released." Id. In this
case, the Defendant did request the use of a phone and was denied use of a phone
until after an independent BAC would not have provided useful evidence.
For the above reasons, the Motion to Suppress the State's BAC test 1s
GRANTED.
6

(R., pp.140-41.)
The State has not challenged any of the district court's factual findings in this appeal,
including the district court's finding that Mr. Stegall asked for, but was denied, a phone call after
the blood draw. (R., p.132.) As such, the question for this Court is whether, in light of the facts
found by the district court, the district court erred in granting Mr. Stegall's motion to suppress
the results of the State-administered BAC test. Mr. Stegall submits that the district court's ruling
was amply supported both by the evidence and by governing case law, and that this Court should
therefore affirm the district court.
The State concedes that once it obtained blood from Mr. Stegall pursuant to a warrant, he
had a due process right to obtain independent testing. (App. Br., p.6 n.2.) However, the State
claims that the district court erred because Mr. Stegall failed to prove a due process violation,
because he proved only that he requested a phone call but did not indicate that the purpose of the
telephone call was to arrange for independent testing. (App. Br., p.4.) However, Idaho law does
not require a defendant to make such an assertion in order to establish a due process violation in
these circumstances. See State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Jacobson, 150
Idaho 131 (Ct. App. 2010).
In Jacobson, the Court set forth the standard for due process claims:
It is fundamental to our legal system that the State shall not deprive "any person

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. It is a two-step process to determine due process rights: first, deciding
whether a governmental decision would deprive an individual of a liberty or
property interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause; and second, if a liberty or property interest is implicated, a balancing test
must be applied to determine what process is due. State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738,
740, 170 P.3d 881, 883 (2007) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 33335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902-03, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 32-34 (1976)). "[M]inimum procedural
due process requirements ultimately tum on a highly fact-specific inquiry."
Sonnleitner v. York, 304 F.3d 704, 713 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying the Mathews
three-part balancing test to a government employee's claim of an adverse
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employment action). The reviewing courts analyze the totality of the
circumstances. See State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 562, 199 P.3d 123, 137 (2008)
(whether an out-of-court identification violated due process turns on the totality of
the circumstances); State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 879, 736 P.2d 1327, 1333
(1987) (applying the totality of the circumstances to evaluate whether a
confession was voluntary or violated due process); State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181,
184, 911 P.2d 774, 777 (Ct. App. 1995) ("due process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands") (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484,
494 (1972)).

Jacobson, 150 Idaho at 134-35.
The due process clause under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant "fundamental fairness" in the criminal proceedings
against him. Carr, 128 Idaho 183-84. "The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process
is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations."

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). Due process is a flexible concept, and must
be applied to the unique facts and circumstances of every case. Carr, 128 Idaho at 184.
In granting Mr. Stegall's motion to suppress the BAC test results, the district court relied
on State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181 (Ct. App. 1995). (R., pp.140-41.) The issue presented in Carr
was ''whether Carr's constitutional rights were violated when the State denied her request to
telephone her attorney following the administration of the State's BAC test." Carr, 128 Idaho at
183 (emphasis in original). The Court recognized that Ms. Carr did not assert her statutory right
to an independent BAC test; however, the Court nonetheless concluded:
Carr's arguments regarding the denial of her right to gather exculpatory evidence
and her right to a fair trial are essentially due process claims, although couched
[to the magistrate court and on appeal to the district court] in terms of the
interference with her ability to contact counsel. We further conclude that Carr
was denied her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.

Id. The Court analyzed the facts of Ms. Carr's case using the test for determining whether state
action violates procedural due process as set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
8

(1976). Id. 128 Idaho at 184. When considering a due process challenge, the Court considers
three factors:
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the existing procedures used and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
(3) the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Id. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.) In DUI cases, a defendant's ability to gather exculpatory

evidence to contradict the officer's evidence that the defendant was intoxicated implicates
"substantial" interests of the defendant. Id. 128 Idaho at 185. The Carr Court concluded that,
when analyzing the second factor, a procedure denying a DUI arrestee access to a telephone
upon request until well after any alcohol in the bloodstream has dissipated, "causes a great risk
of erroneous deprivation of the arrestee's interest in obtaining evidence in his or her defense."
Id. Further, the value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards is also great. Id. Finally,

as for the third factor, the government's interest, the Carr Court noted that there was no reason
given for refusing to allow the defendant a phone call, and the fiscal and administrative burden
of allowing an incarcerated person a telephone call is minimal. Id. Here, like Carr, Mr. Stegall
asserts that his due process rights were violated when he was denied access to a phone, thereby
necessitating a due process analysis under Mathews. The facts in Mr. Stegall's case endure a
nearly identical analysis to those in Carr, and the district court correctly found a violation of his
procedural due process rights. (R., pp.139-41.)
The State analyzes the district court's decision as a spoliation claim. 2 (App. Br. pp.5-6.)
The State analyzes the due process violation as one in which evidence of unknown exculpatory

2

Mr. Stegall also noted in his Motion to Suppress that the State had destroyed the blood drawn
from Mr. Stegall that evening, thus depriving him of the opportunity to have the State's evidence
9

value was destroyed, thus the court must look at whether the police acted in bad faith. (App.
Br., pp.5-6.) The State faults Mr. Stegall for failing to prove the evidence he wanted to obtain
was exculpatory and for failing to allege and prove bad faith. (App. Br., pp.6-7.)
The spoliation doctrine "provides that when a party with a duty to preserve evidence
intentionally destroys it, an inference arises that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to that
party." Ada County Highway District v. Total Success Invs. LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 368 (2008).
In Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 812 (1999), the Court explained:
The evidentiary doctrine of spoliation recognizes it is unlikely that a party
will destroy favorable evidence. Thus, the doctrine of spoliation provides
that when a party with a duty to preserve evidence intentionally destroys
it, an inference arises that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to that
party. Spoliation is a rule of evidence applicable at the discretion of the trial
court.

Bromley, 132 Idaho at 812 (internal citations omitted). In criminal cases, the State has a duty to
preserve materially exculpatory evidence for use by the defense. State v. Lewis, 144 Idaho 64
(2007). Application of a favorable inference under the spoliation doctrine is the appropriate
remedy for a due process violation resulting from failure to preserve potentially useful evidence
due to bad faith on the part of the police. Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806 (1995).
Here, Mr. Stegall did not challenge the State's destruction of the blood sample in his
motion to suppress. (See R., pp.50-64.) He did not assert that he was entitled to an inference
that the result of the blood sample taken by the State was favorable to him. (Id.) The district
court did not hear argument relating to the spoliation doctrine (see 10/18/19 Tr.), nor did its
memorandum decision and order address whether the government spoliated evidence

independently tested by his own expert. (R., pp.62-63.) The prosecution, in its Brief in
Opposition to Motion to Suppress, refuted this assertion, claiming that the Idaho State Police had
retained the blood sample. (R., p.68.) It is unclear why the appellant believes a spoliation
analysis is appropriate in light of the prosecutor's assertion.
10

(R., pp.140-41).

The government's duty to preserve evidence already collected is not

synonymous with a defendant's procedural due process right to a fair opportunity to defend
against the State's accusations. The applicable test is the test for determining whether state
action violates procedural due process; thus, the State's analysis pertaining to spoliation is
inapposite to Mr. Stegall's case.
Alternatively, the State claims that Mr. Stegall was required to ask for a phone call and
explain that he wanted to place the call in order arrange for independent BAC testing. (App.
Br., pp.4-8.) However, this argument was considered and rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals
in Carr. In Carr, the defendant was arrested for DUI, taken to the county jail, and read the
advisory form for evidentiary testing. Id. 128 Idaho 182. While the officer was reading the
advisory form, Ms. Carr asked to call an attorney and was told that she had no right to contact an
attorney before the test. Id. After Ms. Carr failed the test, she asked when she could talk to her
attorney and was told she could "make any phone calls as soon as the jail personnel were ready
to let her make the phone calls." Id. Ms. Carr only asked to be able to contact an attorney-she
did not request an independent test, nor did she indicate what she hoped to gain by speaking to
an attorney. Id. Ms. Carr made several more requests to contact an attorney, all of which were
denied.

Id.

Approximately five hours after her arrest, Ms. Carr was permitted to use the

telephone, and she contacted a bondsman. Carr, 128 Idaho at 182. In Carr, the State argued that
by not asking for an additional test, Ms. Carr slumbered on her rights. 128 Idaho at 185. The
Court of Appeals found this argument "unconvincing, if not specious." Id. The Court held,
"[b]y denying Carr access to a telephone for approximately five hours after her arrest for DUI,
the State denied her the means by which she could establish her defense." Id. 128 Idaho at 184.
The Court further described the "private interest" affected in Ms. Carr's case:

11

As recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court, an "inherent exigency" exists in a
DUI setting, due to the destruction of the evidence by metabolism of alcohol in
the blood. Therefore, the only opportunity for a defendant in a DUI case to gather
exculpatory evidence is within a reasonable time following arrest and
administration of the State's BAC test.
Carr, 128 Idaho at 184. "[W]hen a person is arrested for DUI and given an evidentiary BAC

test, that person must be allowed, at a minimum, to make a phone call upon request to do so."
Id. This contact provides the means by which the arrestee may gather evidence to refute the

State's evidence of intoxication and thereby preserve the "right to a fair opportunity to defend
against the State's accusations." Id. (quoting Chambers, supra). The Carr Court also noted
additional reasons for the requirement of a phone call-the contacted person could arrange for a
photograph to show the arrestee's eyes were not bloodshot, to prepare an audio recording to
show the arrestee's speech was not slurred, to prepare a video recording of the arrestee walking
and doing field sobriety tests without error. Id. 128 Idaho at 184-85.
Although the State recognizes the Court of Appeals holding in Carr, it claims that the
more recent case of State v. Hedges, 143 Idaho 884 (Ct. App. 2007), changed the analysis such
that Carr is no longer applicable. (App. Br., p. 7.) However, Hedges is distinguishable from the
facts in Mr. Stegall's case. In Hedges, the defendant argued that his due process and statutory
rights were violated. 3 143 Idaho at 886. The Court did not address the due process argument,

3

The statute at issue in Mr. Hedges case was LC. § 18-8002(4)(d) which was re-numbered as
LC.§ 18-8002(2)(f). Idaho Code§ 18-8002 states, in relevant part:
(1) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in
this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for
concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have
given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other
intoxicating substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request
of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been
driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the
provisions of section 18-8004 or 18-8006, Idaho Code.
12

finding that Mr. Hedges failed to request a telephone call, thus the police did not affirmatively
deny him the use of a phone. 143 Idaho 889. The Hedges Court's analysis was focused on
LC.§ 18-8002 and the State's compliance with that statute, which provides that, "[a]fter
submitting to evidentiary testing he may, when practicable, at his own expense, have additional
tests made by a person of his own choosing." LC.§ 18-8002(2)(±). As for Mr. Hedges' assertion
that his statutory right was denied, the Court held, "we now determine the police are not required
to guess whether a defendant has asserted his or her right based upon the defendant's passing
references to additional testing ... once informed of this right [to an independent BAC test], a
defendant must make a clear and unambiguous statement of his or her desire to obtain an
independent BAC test, such that a reasonable police officer under the circumstances would
understand the statement to be an affirmative assertion thereof" Id. 143 Idaho at 888.

In

Mr. Stegall's case, the district court properly distinguished Hedges, writing, "The record reflects
that Hedges did not request the use of a phone, nor did he ask to arrange for an independent BAC
test while he was in custody." (R., p.141 (citing Hedges, 143 Idaho at 889).)
Furthermore, in State v. Jacobson, a Court of Appeals decision published post-Hedges,
the Court again analyzed the due process violation where the DUI arrestee was not permitted to
make a telephone call. 150 Idaho 131, 134-35 (Ct. App. 2010). The Jacobson Court thoroughly
analyzed Carr and applied Carr's holding, "[d]ue process is violated if an officer refuses to

(2) Such person shall not have the right to consult with an attorney before
submitting to such evidentiary testing.

(f) After submitting to evidentiary testing he may, when practicable, at his own
expense, have additional tests made by a person of his own choosing.

Idaho Code § 18-8002(2)(±).
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allow a DUI arrestee to contact legal counsel after any alcohol concentration test requested by
the officer has been completed or refused." 150 Idaho at 135. Although the Jacobson Court
ultimately concluded that the denial of Mr. Jacobson's request to place a second telephone call
was not violative of his due process rights, this decision was largely based on the arrestee's
unruly behavior-Mr. Jacobson became frustrated with the bail bondsman he was speaking with
by telephone and began arguing with the deputy and refusing to do what was asked of him by jail
staff-facts distinguishable from those in Mr. Stegall's case. Id. 150 Idaho at 136-37.
The district court correctly suppressed the evidence.

Where Mr. Stegall requested a

phone call, which was denied until after the time within which he would have be able to gather
any exculpatory evidence to counter the State's claim that he was over the legal limit, the district
court did not err in granting his motion to suppress the evidence obtained in violation of his due
process rights.

Mr. Stegall respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order

suppressing the result ofhis BAC test.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Stegall respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's Memorandum
Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
DATED this 10th day of April, 2020.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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